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Abstract. The Scandinavian countries are often seen as a unity. However, during
the COVID-19 pandemic striking differences on how the countries approached
the crisis became evident. This quantitative-ethnographic (QE) study aimed to
understand political and cultural similarities and differences between the three
Scandinavian countries – Denmark, Norway and Sweden – through their crisis
communications during the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, we focused on
how the health authorities of the three countries, in their press releases, treated in-
formation about COVID-19 and acted in four fields: reorganization of population
behavior, containment of viral transmission, preparation of health systems, and
management of socioeconomic impacts. As a methodology, the QE tools nCoder
and ENA were applied, respectively: to code the press releases and to correlate
the treatment of information with the four fields of action.
Keywords: COVID-19 · pandemic · crisis communication · quantitative ethnog-
raphy
1 Introduction
Crisis communication is the ‘collection, processing and dissemination of information
required to address a crisis situation’ [4, p.20]. Studying and evaluating communication
strategies in health crisis situations is essential as their effectiveness reduces negative
impact and prevents casualties. Research in crisis communication has rarely taken a
comparative perspective as most investigations are limited to single case studies [20].
We take the global pandemic, caused by the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus (COVID-19) as
an opportunity to undergo one of the first comparisons of crisis communication strate-
gies across three Scandinavian countries.
On March 11, 2020 the World Health Organization (WHO) started to characterize
the spread of COVID-19 as a global pandemic [28]. During an ongoing pandemic, the
media, the government, and public health professionals and institutes play a central role
in crisis communication and risk management as they inform the public about the vul-
nerability to the disease and suggest “measures to control the spread of the disease such
as the promotion of individual protection (face masks and hygiene), imposing travel
restrictions, and social distancing” [30]. The Trust and Confidence Model suggests that
how the public estimates the risk associated with the disease and its willingness to com-
ply with the mentioned countermeasures is strongly dependent on the level of trust and
confidence people have in the government and its institution [26]. Research shows that
people with a higher level of trust in the government are more likely to comply with
what the authorities suggest [19,29,30]. However, groups of people, depending on their
socioeconomic, psychological and cultural background, conceptualize risk differently
and take different stands towards recommended measures [8,29]. This suggests that
how a health crisis is framed and how the public is informed about the risk of a dis-
ease and the measures to control it will, to a large degree, depend on the cultural values
in a country, as well as the governmental organization and the citizens relation to the
state [27]. Thus, a central question is how authorities frame the crisis, communicate the
countermeasures, inform about the risks and thus build up that trust among citizens.
As COVID-19 spread around the world, governments reacted in different ways. We
analyze the differences in crisis communication of governmental health institutions in
Scandinavia at the beginning of the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic in Spring 2020.
In particular, we use the press releases published by health authorities between January
and April in each country. Scandinavia is a sub region in Northern Europe, covering the
three kingdoms of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. The relation between these coun-
tries is characterized by strong historical, cultural, and linguistic ties, which leads to
the Scandinavian countries often being considered a homogeneous unity. From a po-
litical perspective, the three countries are similar in that they developed a welfare state
model where citizens have a high trust in the government [12,11,9]. Despite their salient
closeness in culture and politics, during the COVID-19 pandemic significant differences
between the countries became evident. While Denmark and Norway seemingly pursued
a similar way in terms of their precautionary measures by giving clear instructions for
hygiene, social distancing, etc. Sweden’s government refrained from taking legally en-
forced measures such as closing schools, and decided to take a different path with the
cost of many more deaths6. Acknowledging the differences between the Scandinavian
countries, and especially their different reaction to the pandemic, lead to the following
research question:
What similarities and differences can be found between the governmental response
to the corona crisis in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden through their respective cri-
sis communication strategies conveyed through the public health authorities’ press re-
leases?
6 https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/total-deaths-covid-19?country=DNK NOR SWE
To study this question, we use methods from quantitative ethnography to investigate
the different responses to the pandemic situation in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, and
people’s relationship to the state. During our coding and analysis, two groups of codes
– somewhat aligning with Salious’ [23] two types of information during a pandemic
– were identified as a starting point for understanding the discourses conveyed by the
health authorities in the datasets: (1) what sources of information were considered and
prioritized by the governments, e.g., statistics on the global spread or information on the
symptoms that the virus causes; and (2) the actions taken by the governments e.g., to
monitor and regulate people’s behavior or equip the healthcare system for the challenge.
We developed eight codes and organized them into two frames: four regarding informa-
tion (sources) and four regarding actions. Our approach revealed significant differences
between the countries regarding how the pandemic was framed. While Norway’s and
Sweden’s crisis management followed a clear discourse, Denmark’s framing was more
difficult to interpret.
We continue by presenting the sociological background of our study as well as
relevant empirical work from crisis communication research, before we present our
data collection strategy.
2 Background & Related Work
To structure our investigation of how the three Scandinavian countries responded and
acted in reaction to COVID-19 we needed to base our interpretation in political cul-
ture. This cultural approach was the basis for how we conceptualized the crisis com-
munication the different governments adopted and allowed us to analyze the potential
differences between them. Once we grounded our theoretical approach we are able to
investigate crisis communication in the three countries.
2.1 Pandemic and Crisis Communication as Political Culture
Throughout the history of the social sciences, culture, in general, has been concep-
tualized from different perspectives. In the vast epistemological and methodological
diversity, Cuche affirms the relevance of this concept to social sciences and explains the
diversity of human unity beyond the biological body, by focusing on the ways of acting,
thinking and feeling of individuals that are defined by socio-historical dynamics. [5, p.
9-15].
In this context, the ways that Scandinavian countries treated information regarding
COVID-19 and acted in the reordering of population behavior, the containment of viral
transmission, and the reorganization of health systems, are under cultural determina-
tions. In specific, in order to understand similarities and differences between Scandi-
navian countries in how they handled information and acted in relation to COVID-19,
it can be considered that press releases from health authorities are relevant because of
how they manifest individual variants of habitus. These consist of “generative schemes”
[2] of ways of acting, thinking and feeling of individuals, as their socialization pro-
cesses lead to the internalization of values, norms and other social principles, which
underlie their readings of the world, their rational choices and other individual and so-
cial actions. They are predispositions to act, think and feel, which are “structured and
structuring structures” of socio-historical dynamics between individuals in continuous
socialization that, because of un-interruptibility of social interactions, keep updating
these predispositions.
If we consider a social group in a macro-social perspective, such as the culture of
a country, in order to differentiate Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes in responding to
the COVID-19 pandemic, we need to consider that the choices of the authorities and
the actions of the population are immersed in great social-historical syntheses that are
structured as much as they are structuring structures of generative schemes. Thus, we
can understand that the decision-making individual, as a health authority, “reveals it-
self as a ’structural variant’ of the habitus of its group or class, [and] the personal style
appears as a codified deviation in relation to the style of an era, a class or a social
group” [18, p. 18]. In this way, governmental and population actions in pandemic situa-
tions, such as COVID-19, observed in press releases by health authorities, are empirical
sources for studies about habitus, and henceforth express cultures of different social
groups and countries.
Regarding the Scandinavian countries, the populations’ habitus are by decades in
relation to strong welfare states and high level of trust in government [15,14,13]. How-
ever, these countries’ cultural differences have led to distinct polyarchies [6], in this
paper addressed especially in the differences between distribution of power within the
constitutional monarchies and citizens’ relationship with the State. Moreover, elements
of the habitus of each country are addressed - ethopoliticality in Sweden, to “act fast and
with force” in Denmark and the more careful approach to individual rights in Norway.
2.2 Empirical Work in Crisis Communication
Research in communicating health emergencies have identified the need for unique
forms of risk and crisis communication. Saliou’s [23] investigation in crisis communi-
cation singled out two types of emergency information that are most important; pre-
ventive and reactive messages. Reynolds and Quinn [21] highlighted trust, creditably,
and empathetic communication as essential elements for persuasive communication in
influenza pandemics. Multiple studies investigate the risk perception and government
trust during epidemics and how public health messages are heard, interpreted, and the
responses studied [30]. However, the focus of our study is less on the reaction of the
people and more on how authorities communicate information and actions.
The COVID-19 pandemic is still ongoing, however research on crisis communi-
cation has been part of a large body published articles investigating all aspects of the
epidemic. Early research on crisis communication during the COVID-19 pandemic in
the US shows that even within a country, political leaders and media outlets are hav-
ing divergent ways of framing the crisis and its severity highlighting partisan differ-
ences [1]. Many researchers mentioned the problem of the infodemic that accompanies
the pandemic: which makes it much harder to build trust in what the government says
[17,10].
In summary, it is understood that ways of thinking and acting by government institu-
tions and local populations, which are part of political cultures, in this article observed
in the response of Denmark, Norway and Sweden to the current pandemic situation, are
intimately linked to socio-historical readings of the world by individuals under “gen-
erative schemes” of habitus. In specific, the “ways of thinking and acting” are under
the eight codes selected to interpret the crisis communication of health authorities in
Scandinavian countries: on one hand, information regarding COVID-19 biology, ill-
ness, spread and monitoring; on other hand, actions regarding healthcare system, finan-
cial system, government response and population response (see Table 2).
3 Data Collection, Processing & Coding
To investigate our research question we decided to use the press releases published
by the health agencies of the three Scandinavian countries. The activities of the public
health authorities in the three countries were similar in scope and intensity, and therefore
considered viable objects for comparison. Thus, we took the press releases from the
following three agencies:
Statens Serum Institut7 (SSI) is under the auspices of the Danish Ministry of
Health. The main duty is to ensure preparedness against infectious diseases and bio-
logical threats as well as control of congenital disorders. Folkehelseinstitutet8 (FHI),
the Norwegian Institute of Public Health, is a government agency under the Ministry
of Health and Care Services. FHI provides knowledge about the health status in the
population, influencing factors and how it can be improved; they also have competence
in infectious disease control. Folkhälsomyndigheten9 (FYI), the Public Health Agency
of Sweden, has national responsibility for public health issues and works to ensure good
public health. The agency also works to ensure that the population is protected against
communicable diseases and other health threats.
3.1 Data Collection
To collect the different press releases, we used Octoparse10 to scrape the health author-
ities press releases from their respective web presences over a time frame from the be-
ginning of January to the end of April 2020. In a next step, we used R and the tidytext11
package to clean and process the documents. First, we deleted non-COVID-19 related
press releases and cleaned the remaining text from HTML tags, etc. Moreover, we to-
kenized the press releases into sentences that we used as stanzas in our coding process
which can be considered our window size for looking at connections later. Following
the cleaning process we translated each stanza from its respective language into English
using the GOOGLETRANSLATE12 function in Google Sheets. Finally, the two central
7 https://en.ssi.dk/
8 https://www.fhi.no/en/
9 https://www.folkhalsomyndigheten.se/
10 https://www.octoparse.com/
11 https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/tidytext/vignettes/tidytext.html
12 https://support.google.com/docs/answer/3093331?hl=en
tools in quantitative ethnographic research, nCoder13 and Epistemic Network Analy-
sis14 (ENA), were employed by coding the press releases in nCoder and visualizing the
outcome of the coding process using ENA.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the dataset.
Institute # press releases avg. # tokens per release # stanzas (i.e. coded units)
SSI (Denmark) 42 348.1 752
FHI (Norway) 71 257.6 955
FYI (Sweden) 58 249.9 717
Table 1 summarises descriptive statistics of our dataset. All in all, the applied data
collection process resulted in a total of 171 press releases with 42 from the Danish SSI,
71 from Norwegian FHI, and 58 from the Swedish FYI. While press releases published
by the Norwegian and Swedish health institutes are on average of similar length (FHI
257.6 vs FYI 249.9 tokens), the Danish press releases are quite longer with 348.1 tokens
on average. When looking at the number of stanzas the Norwegian FHI accounts for
most stanzas in the dataset (955), which aligns with the fact that they also published the
most press releases during the period of analysis.
3.2 Coding Process
An iterative four-phase feedback loop guided the coding process. The three initial
phases of the coding process followed the circle for interpretation and understanding
of the datasets proposed by Shaffer [25]. The fourth, final coding process, followed the
test-retest reliability of nCoder [25].
Phase (1), Planning: This phase involved setting team focus, brainstorming, making
hypotheses, and development of the first codes. The coding process was initiated from
the primary focus of the study, i.e. the differences in crisis communication and the
discourse (narrative framing) of the Scandinavian countries with a focus on the peoples
relationship to the state. From this overarching focus, two key themes were identified
as a starting point for understanding the structure of the discourses in the datasets: (1)
the information sources and (2) the response (actions) of the governments.
After the themes were discussed, joint brainstorming sessions were conducted to
find keywords, subsequently used in the development of codes. Therefore, the first strat-
egy was to visualize the health press releases from the health agencies in the form of
a comparison cloud (Figure 1) that enabled identification of the most common key-
words linked to each country’s discourse. Based on the size and color of words, the
relative frequency throughout the corpus was visually indicated. However, it should be
noted that if a keyword such as “health” or “general” only appeared in one colour, it
did not mean that other authorities did not use that word, but that this authority was
the one that used the word most frequently. The second strategy was to watch YouTube
13 http://www.n-coder.org/
14 http://www.epistemicnetwork.org/
Fig. 1. Comparison wordcloud visualizing the most frequent words used by each health agency.
videos from various press conferences held by the three countries’ governments and
ministries. Both strategies had the purpose of collecting and defining keywords and
helping with hypotheses modeling. Thus, hypotheses were created from the two focus
themes and the findings made in the brainstorming process. For example, the initial
hypothesis concerned how the three countries would differ in how people acted individ-
ually and collectively as a response to measures taken, if states were to adopt a proactive
or reactive strategy for control, and if the economic status and issues regarding illness,
spread, and health care would be other contrasts.
All coding was carried out using the nCoder software and followed the three-step
rating process. Thereto, all codes were modeled using a binary (present/not present)
decision [7]. In the first phase of the coding process, the following codes were tested:
People’s response, Duty of the state, COVID-related, Economy, Epidemic, Healthcare,
and Sickness. Since the first test did not reach a Kappa > 0.9 for the level of agreement
(and with a Rho > 0.05) between human and classifier, a second review of the dataset
was conducted.
Phase (2), Refinement of codes: A second review of the datasets belonging to the
health authorities was carried out by manual screening. As the same hypotheses still
governed the work, the search resulted in more advanced keywords. New codes tested
in phase 2 of the coding process were: Healthcare, Government actions, Government
response – Financial, Intelligence2, and Peoples relationship to the state.
Phase (3), Additional tests: Phase 3 of the coding process specifically focused on
discourse around health-related phenomena. The following codes were selected and
tested based on previous examinations of the data sets: Epidemic, Health Care System,
Biology of the Disease, and Illness. As test sets from coding phase 2 and 3 did not reach
the level of agreement between human vs. classifier with a Kappa < 0.9 (Rho > 0.05),
a final, fourth, coding round was initiated.
Phase (4), Test-retest: Through ongoing discussions, a consensus on keywords was
reached among the members of the research group, based partly on the research focus
and partly on the importance of the keywords in relation to the discourses in the data
sets. Therefore, the initial phases were essential in order to enable reliable and valid
codes while reducing bias. After a high level of agreement was reached using a specific
test-set (Kappa > 0.9 and Rho < 0.05), subsequent steps in nCoder were completed
with acceptable values for inter-rater reliability and validity for the entire dataset.
Table 2 presents the results of the four-phase process, i.e. the final coding scheme.
In the remains of the paper, codes will be highlighted as seen in this table based on their
type as information codes and action codes.
Table 2. The final coding scheme presenting the codes, their description, keywords and type. The
codes were used in an automatic coding process via nCoder.
Code Description Keywords Type
Illness Discourse that addresses the human
symptoms and body reactions.
Fever, Respiratory, breath, cough, throat, pain, vomit,
asympto, transmit, sick, symptom, flu
Information
Biology of the Disease Discourse characteristics of nCoV, how it relates
to other viruses, and how it is biologically transmitted between people.
Sars, ncov, mers, communicable, virus Information
Epidemic Spread Discourse about the spread of the virus on a global
and a national level as well as related to social activities and locations.
Abroad, Market, Spread, Outbreak, Epidemi, Pandemi, Contamin,
Contageous, Drop, Surface, Crowd, Gathering, Wuhan, China,
Fish, Seafood, Abroad
Information
Monitoring Stats Compilations of cumulative and numerical nature, such as reports,
and calculations regarding the number of those hospitalized or ill.
Report, Rate, Statistic, Monitor, Register, Number,
Total, Figure, Graph
Information
Healthcare System Healthcare system-related materiality - entities such as laboratories,
doctors, and practices such as intensive care, hospitals, and hospitalization.
Microbiolog, Laborator, Nurs, Doctor, Worker, Professional,
Admit, Intensive, Care, Hospital, Patient
Action
Financial Discourse addressing the nations’ financial situations,
and initiatives related to the states economy.
Money, Budget, Unemploy, Financ, Econom, Cost Action
Peoples Responsibilities Response Discourse addressing people’s actions to follow
recommendations and prevent spread.
Distanc, Distancing, Hygiene, Wash, Soap Action
Government Response Control Discourse regarding government’s actions to monitor
and assess the situation and to recommend and regulate people’s behavior
Guideline, Information, Measures, Measuring, Recommend,
Recommendation, Monitor, Monitoring, Assess, Assessment, Advice
Action
4 Results & Analysis
To answer our main research question of whether we can identify differences in the
health crisis communication of the three Scandinavian countries, we started our anal-
ysis by looking at Figure 2 which showed the three main subtraction networks created
via ENA on the basis of our coded data. The subtraction networks show each country’s
centroid in the form of a square with dotted boxes, which indicate their confidence in-
tervals (CI) in both dimensions of the projection space. A centroid summarises each
network as a single point in the projection space and allows for an easy comparison
of a large number of networks as the position explains the variance between the net-
works. The centroids for all three countries are distributed far away from each other
with non-overlapping CIs, which was the first indicator that differences existed in how
the discourse about the health crisis was framed in each country. Non-parametric Mann-
Whitney tests supported this observation statistically. Along the first dimension (x-axis)
all three countries are distributed significantly differently from each other. (DK-SE:
Mdn = 0.39, N = 58, U = 685.00, p = 0.00, r = 0.44; DK-NO: Mdn = 0.19,
N = 42, U = 640.50, p = 0.00, r = 0.57; NO-SE: Mdn = 0.39, N = 58,
Fig. 2. Subtraction networks for all three country combinations A) Norway-Sweden, B)
Denmark-Sweden and C) Norway-Denmark. The distribution of the centroids hints to a clear
difference in crisis communication among the three countries.
U = 514.50, p = 0.00, r = 0.75). Along the second dimension (y-axis), only Den-
mark and Norway showed statistically significant differences (Mdn = 0.19, N = 42,
U = 2043.50, p = 0.00, r = −0.37), that allowed for the conclusion that they also
shared some similarities in how they communicated. All in all, this indicated clearly
that Denmark, Norway, and Sweden communicated very differently during the pan-
demic and had divergent centres of attention in the framing of the discourse, but they
also shared some common themes.
4.1 Differences in Crisis Communication
To determine which codes account for the differences between the networks of two
countries, two signals were used. First, we looked at the position of the centroids in
relation to the position of the codes. Second, we compared the weighted connection
(thickness of lines) in each subtraction network. Here we looked for thicker ties (lines),
which indicated stronger differences, and the colour of the tie (line), which provided
information on which of the two countries involved has a stronger connection between
the two codes. Norway’s centroid (compared to DK and SE) sat closer to the codes
Monitoring Stats, Biology of the Disease and Healthcare System. Furthermore, in both
subtraction plots, one observed thick blue ties between the codes, which indicated that
these three codes are highly central for Norway’s framing of the pandemic and its health
agency’s crisis communication. Sweden, on the other hand, is the country whose cen-
troid sat closest to Epidemic Spread. Compared to Norway and Denmark, Sweden’s
Fig. 3. Close-up views of the mean epistemic networks to illustrate the different relationships
between the codes for A) Denmark, B) Sweden and C) Norway.
emphasis was positioned clearly on the relation between Epidemic Spread and Govern-
ment Response Control. A less clear picture emerged for Denmark as its centroid was
between Norway and Sweden (see figure 2). Compared to Norway, Denmark placed a
stronger focus on Epidemic Spread and Healthcare System, whereas the tie between
Epidemic Spread and Monitoring Stats differentiates it clearly from Sweden. To get a
clearer picture of what these differences in tie strength mean for the individual coun-
tries’ crisis communication, section 4.2 takes a closer look at each country’s mean epis-
temic network.
4.2 The Discourse on the Scandinavian Countries’ Framing of the COVID-19
Pandemic
An analysis process based on four levels was used to explore each country’s crisis com-
munication and discourse around the pandemic. In level 1, we performed a simple vi-
sual analysis of the network and took note of the ties between codes. Level 2 relates
the codes involved in strong ties to their type, i.e. information or action codes. Level
3 aimed at an even deeper understanding of the ties by relating the codes involved to
their descriptions and keywords (see Table 2). In the final and fourth level the inter-
pretative loop was closed by relating the quantitative results to the qualitative data, i.e.
quotes from the health agencies press releases (stanzas) as seen in previous quantitative
ethnographic work [24].
Norway Figure 3 B) visualises Norway’s mean epistemic network. The network indi-
cates a strong relationship between the four codes Healthcare System, Monitoring Stats,
Biology of the Disease and Government Response Control. The action code Healthcare
System is strongly tied to the sources of information Monitoring Stats and Biology of
the Disease and stands in relation to the action code Government Response Control.
This can be interpreted as the actions regarding equipping laboratories, the increment
of medical staff and admission rates to hospitals, as well as investments in a capacity
such as intensive care, were mainly influenced by three factors: (a) accumulated infor-
mation and facts referring to numbers and figures on the national level such as reports
and registers, (b) information on the coronavirus and how it transfers between humans
bodies; and (c) actions taken by the government to monitor and assess the situation and
to recommend and regulate people’s behavior. The information that supplemented the
specific actions taken by the healthcare system were publicly presented and communi-
cated to the citizens as the following excerpts show: “there are a total of 166 people
with confirmed SARS-CoV-2 that have been admitted to intensive care unit, of which
104 are still hospitalized” (ID:1154).
Moreover, Government Response Control is connected to the source of information
Monitoring Stats and the action code Healthcare System. This indicates that govern-
mental actions were mainly fed by accumulated national information (Monitoring stats)
on the effectiveness of measures. The following quote exemplifies this: “The report
concludes that the measures implemented have reduced infection figures considerably.”
(ID:1088).
Finally, the following excerpt from the press releases shows how the public was
informed about the relation between government actions (Government Response Con-
trol) and the effects for the healthcare system (Healthcare System): “such a strategy has
four assumptions: increased testing, and improved surveillance, a good understanding
of the situation so that we can quickly discover traits that may require adjustments to
the infection control measures, and restructuring the business of health care.” (ID:855)
Sweden Sweden’s epistemic network (Figure 3 C) indicates a strong tie between Gov-
ernment Response Control and Epidemic Spread, which can be explained by the fact
that the government actions were mainly informed by sources of information regarding
the spread of the virus. Furthermore, a strong tie between Epidemic Spread and Illness
can be observed. This indicates that the actions taken by the government to monitor
and assess the situation and to recommend and regulate people’s behavior was mainly
influenced by the information on the spread of the virus on a global and a national
level, as well as related to social activities and locations. Additionally, the information
around the spread of the virus was linked to the information gathered around the hu-
man symptoms and body reactions (Illness). The information available about the spread
was used to inform governmental actions, e.g. actions on creating guidelines and how
such measures (Government Response Control) were generally used to prevent con-
tamination between people (Epidemic Spread). The Swedish FYI communicated these
guidelines and additionally tried to justify them by adding contextual information that
informed the decision making process. This was seen in press release excerpts such as
the following: “public health authorities have decided to change the Agency’s regula-
tions and general guidelines (HSLF-FS 2020:12) on everyone’s responsibility to pre-
vent contamination of COVID-19 and make an exception for children and young peo-
ple.” (ID:1786). However, we also saw that more information did not necessarily lead
to any changes in the means to address the disease: “the assessments of risk and the
important strategies and measures presented in recent days remain - Now that WHO
has now declared that COVID-19 is a pandemic does not make a difference in how we
manage the disease.” (ID: 2197). The relationship between how the coronavirus spreads
(Epidemic.Spread) and how it affected individuals (Illness), is shown by the following
example: “Infections, Infectiousness and Infection Risks COVID-19 infects from per-
son to person through drip and contact infections, that is, via drops and secretions from
the airways that spread when someone coughs or sneezes, and at close contact between
people.” (ID: 1968)
Denmark The press releases published by the Danish authorities, as seen in Figure
3 C), indicate a strong relation between Healthcare System and three codes covering
sources of information: Monitoring Stats, Epidemic Spread and Illness. Similar to the
Norwegian authorities, the Danes informed the public on how they base the actions
taken regarding the healthcare system, i.e. equipping laboratories, the increase of med-
ical staff and investments in capacity such as intensive care were on (a) accumulated
information and facts referring to numbers and figures on the national level such as
reports and registers, (b) information around the spread of the virus on a global and a
national level, as well as related to social activities and location, and (c) the information
on the human symptoms and body reactions: “now that it is primarily in patients with
severe symptoms who tested positive we work hard to put monitoring systems up that
also can follow the spread of infection in the community, such as by random testing
of people who have contacted the doctor with mild symptoms [...] confirmed COVID-
19 event in Denmark the 1044 cases, 672 men and 372 women aged 0-94 years” (ID:
365). Furthermore, Epidemic Spread has a strong relationship with Biology of the Dis-
ease, which indicates that the press releases commented on how the virus spreads on
a global and national level through social activities and specific locations (e.g., nursing
homes) and linked it to information on how the virus transfers between human bodies.
Finally, the analysis of the Danish press releases link Government Response Control
to Monitoring Stats, and reveal a mutual relationship to Healthcare System. This indi-
cated that the actions taken by the government to monitor and assess the situation lead
to accumulated information and facts referring to numbers and figures in reports and
public health registers, which were made publicly accessible. In addition, the actions
taken by the government to monitor and assess the situation are linked to Healthcare
System, i.e. the actions around equipping laboratories, increment of medical staff and
so forth. These activities, carried out to improve the healthcare system, are supported
by the government’s efforts to mitigate the consequences of viral transmission (Govern-
ment Response Control), as exemplified by the following quote: “The new guidelines
from SST practice this update criteria for suspicious coronavirus infection, and instruc-
tions for handling patients and contacts to match the latest knowledge about the disease,
infection risk, etc” (ID:608).
However, one has to acknowledge that crisis communication during the corona pan-
demic was and is still an evolving process where actions by the government might get
updated later as compared to earlier reports, as the following excerpt indicates: “the new
infections, which is the first in Denmark, does not change the current risk assessment
that State Serum Institute and the Board of Health issued on Tuesday, the assessment is
that there is low risk that we see widespread infection in Danish society, and low risk
that our health care system is challenged.” (ID:500).
In the next and final section, we discuss our findings by linking them back to our
background and related work presented in section 2.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this article, we addressed the question of how different health authorities in Denmark,
Norway, and Sweden framed crisis communication during the COVID-19 crisis in early
months of 2020 (January through the end of March). We applied a quantitative ethno-
graphic approach by the use of nCoder for the automatic coding of press release data.
Additionally, we visualized the relation of these codes using ENA. Our main results
can be summarized as follows: On the one hand, some of the codes that we developed
to cover the discourse around the pandemic (e.g., Monitoring Stats,Epidemic Spread,
and Healthcare System), occurred much more frequently than others, which hinted at
similarities in the countries’ press release reports. On the other hand, the subtraction
networks (Figure 2) showed a significant difference in each country’s framing, which
was surprising given their sociocultural closeness. In the following paragraph, we dis-
cuss our findings from the perspective of political cultures and polyarchies, and how the
concept of habitus can be interpreted as constitutive of generative schemes reflecting
peoples ways of acting and thinking.
A central finding is Sweden’s closeness to the code Epidemic Spread and the strong
tie the code builds to Government Response Control. The frequent co-occurrence of
these two codes and the tie they form separated Sweden’s discourse strongly from the
crisis communication of its neighbouring countries. This characteristic of Sweden’s
crisis communication can potentially be linked back to the characteristics of welfare
states, polyarchy regimes, the resulting autonomy of the Swedish health authorities and
the ethopolitical character of Swedish habitus. Despite the fact that the three Scandi-
navian countries are constitutional monarchies, the health authorities in Sweden, have
more decision-making autonomy in affecting the behavior of the population, while “the
politicians are more directly in charge of the administration in Norway and Denmark”
[27]. During the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, this difference in autonomy made it
“easier in Denmark and Norway to react quickly with political decisions and even to
overrule authorities and their expertise” [27]. Although the three countries’ health au-
thorities were initially against severe measures [3,27], the less restrictive measures were
applied only in Sweden. To understand Sweden’s way of informing the public during
the crisis even further, a cultural perspective was applied. Nygren and Olofsson consider
[13] that the less restrictive measures taken by this country can further be explained by
the biopolitics of “governing of conduct and individual responsibilization” [16]. If one
interprets Nikolas Rose’s studies on ethopolitics as biopolitics merged with a set of val-
ues, practices and moralities on how life ought to be lived by individuals, Sweden’s
way of communicating the crisis is a good example of how to inform citizens with high
autonomy for self-government [22]. It referred to citizenship guided by high trust in the
state, in which the conduct of health authorities has historically been marked by routine
communication on recommendations for a healthy life. However, this attitude can also
be seen as naive, as Swedish citizens are said to blindly follow any recommendation
[27].
Sweden differs from Denmark and Norway, which followed a stronger discourse
lead around Healthcare System together with accumulated information on statistics,
symptoms, and virus characteristics. For instance, in the Swedish political culture the
government response to regulate peoples’ behavior, appeared more prominently than
the less regulatory character of the action code Healthcare System, seen to be stronger
in Denmark and Norway. From a ethopolitical perspective, the Swedish health author-
ities’ acknowledgement of the global and national information spread, fed into the ac-
tions to create guidelines, disseminate information and make recommendations, and
helped to mitigate the consequences of the corona-spread. Hence, such actions reflect
the relationship between the state and the people, since milder restrictions convey the
trustful relationship between the government and the Swedish citizens’ habitus of self-
governance.
Another central finding was Norway’s focus on information around Biology of the
Disease, the statistics, numbers and reports on the amount of tested and infected citi-
zens (Monitoring Stats), and the strong connection both had with actions taken by the
Healthcare System (see Figure 2. A) and C)). This draws attention to the more inclusive
character of the Norwegian polyarchy’s decision-making process. According to Chris-
tensen, the Norwegian government has a political leadership characterized by bringing
together diverse sectors of state and society, such as health authorities, opposition par-
ties, executives and workers [3]. This Norwegian characteristic became strongly evident
during the management of the COVID-19 pandemic [3], and the press releases tended
to illuminate the inclusive character of the Norwegian habitus.
From a cultural perspective, regarding the restrictive measures taken in Denmark
and Norway, Olagnier and Davidsen stated that the Danish reaction to COVID-19 can be
characterized as “act fast and act with force” [15], due to the fast adoption of restrictive
measures and the national speeches to enforce the isolation. Although Norway also
adopted restrictive measures and the use of force, Strang highlighted that the political
culture of Norway is marked by a greater concern that political changes could limit the
individual’s democratic rights and weaken democracy [27]. Such political culture can
be seen in laws and other regulations taken to ensure that COVID-19 special measures
were not threatening democracy and individual rights. For instance, when the Swedish
government proposed to empower government officials to take action more quickly, the
public debate regarded how it would impact the relationship between government and
parliament, not whether it would lead to a risk to individual rights. The Danish strategy
“act fast” and the “careful” Norwegian habitus, are both important to explain why the
former country’s actions related to the health care system are informed by Illness, and
the latter country’s actions related to the healthcare system is informed by Biology of
the Disease.
Denmark’s crisis communication was much harder to interpret, as it is located cen-
trally between the other two countries, and focuses on information from many sources
that inform actions on multiple governmental levels (see Figure 3 A)). However, the spe-
cial role that Denmark represents might be explained by the “fast” reopening (earlier
and more permissive than Norway), which led to a greater need to inform the popula-
tion about the transmission of the virus on surfaces and about characteristic symptoms
of COVID-19.
Our study shows that quantitative ethnographic methods can be used to take a com-
parative perspective in crisis communication research. Yet, we found some methodolog-
ical challenges with the combination of tools used. For example, using machine trans-
lation with Google translate, and possible translation errors of the keywords that could
impinge on the construction of codes in nCoder. However, multiple manual screenings
of the source file showed only a few errors that were then corrected.
Theoretically, research on habitus can contribute to problematize cultural ways of
acting. In particular, this study briefly problematized Scandinavian “generative schemes”
of acting-thinking regarding the “high trust in State”, specifically in the crisis commu-
nication during the COVID-19 pandemic. In summary, the particularities discussed –
Swedish “ethopolitical life,” Danish “act fast and with force” and Norwegian “careful-
ness” – can signal for attention on, e.g.: the Swedes’ and Danes’ level of criticality on
State measures and the Norwegians’ level of tolerance to political changes. These re-
sults can contribute to a better understanding of the “generative schemes” and of “high
trust in State,” and therefore to research and practices on democratic life.
Finally, our findings are only limited to press releases of health agencies, which
potentially limits the degree of conclusions we can draw from our study. For example,
discourses around the Peoples Responsibilities Response were not salient, which re-
flects difficulties in finding additional keywords that could enclose this particular code
in a good way. Moreover, the discourse around the Financial situation was not present
in the press releases why this code could not be related to the actions of the three gov-
ernments. This perspective is, however, essential as many countries now face economic
difficulties due to the enforced lock-downs. As the COVID-19 pandemic is still un-
derway, future work can investigate additional resources such as the speeches of the
prime ministers, to gain a more holistic picture on the Scandinavian countries’ crisis
communication.
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